Syrians realized unstable Iraq would not serve them – analyst
BAGHDAD / IraqiNews.com: A Western political analyst viewed that the stability of Iraq is essential for a dialogue to be launched between the United States and Syria , adding the Syrians have realized that their role in shaking Iraq ‘s stability will reflect on them. Engagement with Syria has been featured among the U.S. administration’s promised foreign policy changes, yet so far a mechanism for cooperation has eluded both sides. Renewed negotiations with Israel must wait for the political dust to settle in Jerusalem , according to Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group (ICG). Damascus is unlikely to accede to U.S. requests for shifting policies toward Hamas or Hizbollah, and certainly will not do so before significant progress has been made on other fronts. The United States has renewed sanctions. That leaves the topic of Iraq , where both sides expected the road to be smoothest because of apparent shared interests. Instead, U.S. officials accuse Damascus of allowing — if not abetting — the infiltration of militants across the border to Iraq . Securing this border was supposed to be the most straightforward of issues, but the question is more complicated than it first appeared and will require a broader discussion about political reconciliation in Iraq and a better understanding of Damascus ’ fluctuating relationship with Sunni armed groups. When Iraq’s former regime collapsed, Syria openly supported those resisting the occupation, busing militants across the border and creating an image that has shaped U.S. opinion ever since. However, the intensifying conflict transformed Syria’s threat perception from one centered on the U.S. agenda for the region to one more concerned about Iraq’s breakup, sectarian dynamics, the influx of refugees and the uncomfortable expansion of Iranian influence. Syria ’s policy was also driven by the government’s desire to deflect its own jihadi problem and rid itself of home-grown activists while placating the jihadi movement as a whole. That policy eventually backfired: Those who didn’t die came back more experienced, better connected and fully indoctrinated — more of a risk than before. As Iraqi Sunnis turned away from foreign volunteers and Damascus adjusted its own posture, Syria lost both a useful outlet and the indulgence of the jihadi community. A series of violent incidents culminating in the 2008 bomb attack in the Syrian capital underscored this shift. Syria ’s dysfunctional border controls are also an important factor. Corruption has long been rife, enabling cross-border networks to operate with cover from high-ranking officials. Moreover, technology is deficient; Damascus only recently introduced a centralized computer system to monitor entries and exits. Despite an antiquated approach to illegal crossings, notable efforts have been made, such as engaging tribes, improving routine controls, and even cracking down on corrupt magnates in order to better protect Syrian territory. Ironically, Syrian officials now complain that the United States and Iraq aren’t doing enough on the Iraqi side to seal the border. Two issues stand out. First, the ambiguous links that Washington accuses Damascus of enjoying with al-Qaida and other armed groups provide Syria with far better intelligence on the former and more leverage on the latter than the search-and-destroy approach typically pursued by the United States. In other words, Syria may think twice about severing ties that bolster its security and enhance its political clout. Second, opening and closing the tap of insurgents going into Iraq likely will remain a valuable pressure point for Damascus in future negotiations with the United States . That said, while U.S. demands on Syria are clear, Syria ’s expectations are clouded in strategic ambiguity. There are other obstacles to effective security cooperation. The uneven quality of